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Abstract This article analyses EU case law concerning damages liability for non-material harm. The focus 
here is on recent case law, most of which concerns EU liability. The contribution first provides an overview 
of cases that deal with non-material damage. Secondly, it explores important themes that emerge from the 
case law, such as the necessity of monetary reparation, the conditions for harm and causation, and the 
amounts of compensation granted. Particular attention is paid to the topical notion of reputational harm. 
Claims concerning damage to reputation or image have frequently emerged in EU liability cases, but 
compensation has not been readily awarded. The European Court of Justice has, however, relatively recently 
upheld a decision awarding damages for unjustified and prolonged inclusion on a “sanctions list” (C-45/15 P 





Sometimes—albeit not often—the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the General Court (GC1) award 
damages for non-material harm. With respect to tort law or damages liability law generally, “non-material 
harm” or “non-material damage”2 refers to harm that is challenging to quantify in monetary terms. This is 
because the damage itself is of a “qualitative” nature and not directly related to a person’s assets, wealth or 
income.3  
 
Relevant types of harm include, in the case of natural persons, pain and comparable suffering, as well as 
harm to emotional well-being. It is debatable whether non-material harm—which is typically experienced as 
discomfort or inconvenience—is even possible in the case of legal entities, such as companies. However, 
legal entities may, at least arguably, suffer non-material harm in the form of, for example, a state of pressure. 
Negative situations faced in the context of commercial or professional activities may also lead to both 
economic and non-material harm, with these types of damage often appearing intertwined.4 
                                               
* Assistant Professor of Private Law. The author wishes to thank Daniel Wyatt for language editing and Professor Erdem Büyüksagis 
for insightful discussions. Any errors remain those of the author. 
1 The abbreviation “GC” is used to refer to the General Court and the Court of First Instance. 
2 Also “non-pecuniary harm” or “non-pecuniary damage”. 
3 See also W.V.H. Rogers, “Comparative Report of a Project Carried Out by the European Centre for Tort and Insurance Law” in 
W.V.H. Rogers (ed.), Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective (Wien: Springer, 2001), pp.245, 246; Opinion 
of Advocate General (AG) Wahl in Petillo and Petillo (C-371/12) EU:C:2013:652 at [38]–[39]. 
4 See also Opinion of AG Wahl in EU v Kendrion NV (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:612 at [112]–[116]. Wahl underlines the actually 
pecuniary nature of some harms that have been previously characterised as non-material damage. Note also, e.g. Rogers, 
“Comparative Report” in Non-Pecuniary Loss (2001), pp.288–289. Some economic damages are abstract and theoretical, and 
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Under EU law, compensation for non-material harm is possible according to particular legislation, but 
damages can also be awarded without any express provision addressing non-material harm. Pieces of EU 
secondary legislation that discuss non-pecuniary damage include the recent General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016/679, which provides that anyone who has “suffered material or non-material damage as a 
result of an infringement of this Regulation” shall have the right to compensation.5 Moreover, Directive 
2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, for example, confirms the compensability of 
“moral prejudice”,6 as does Directive 2016/943 on trade secrets.7 Additionally, Directive 2015/2302 on 
package travel sets out that compensation under the Directive should cover “non-material damage such as ... 
loss of enjoyment of the trip or holiday”.8 However, even where legislation does not expressly mention non-
material harm, the ECJ has generally interpreted the concept of “damage” and other relevant notions broadly, 
including non-material harm in the process.9 
  
A significant proportion of the existing non-material harm case law concerns EU liability, that is, non-
contractual liability under art.340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), and liability in staff 
cases. In this context, non-pecuniary damage is recoverable.10 Non-material harm has also been discussed in 
preliminary rulings concerning, in particular, horizontal liability between private parties and the 
                                               
therefore similar to non-material harm. For example, lost profits are established using hypothetical scenarios where a particular event 
causing the alleged harm would not have taken place. See, e.g. M. Lehmann, “Where does Economic Loss Occur?” (2011) 7 Journal 
of Private International Law 527, 531. 
5 Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1, art.82(1). 
6 Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L157/45, art.13, recital 26. 
7 Directive 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure [2016] OJ L157/1, art.14, recital 30. 
8 Directive 2015/2302 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC [2015] OJ L326/1, recital 
34. 
9 See Leitner (C-168/00) EU:C:2002:163 at [19]–[24] (concerning Directive 90/314 on package travel, package holidays and package 
tours [1990] OJ L158/59); Petillo (C-371/12) EU:C:2014:26 at [34]–[35] (on several Directives concerning insurance against civil 
liability in respect of motor vehicles). See similarly Walz v Clickair SA (C-63/09) EU:C:2010:251 (on the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, concluded in Montreal on 28 May 1999). See also on harm covered by 
“further compensation” (under Regulation 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the 
event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 [2004] OJ L46/1) 
Sousa Rodríguez and Others (C-83/10) EU:C:2011:652 at [36]–[46]. The ECJ has nevertheless noted that non-material harm is not 
covered by the liability rules set out in Directive 85/374 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States concerning liability for defective products 1985 OJ L210/29, as the Directive explicitly notes, in defining 
relevant damage, that “[t]his Article shall be without prejudice to national provisions relating to non-material damage“ (art.9; see also 
art.1): Veedfald (C-203/99) EU:C:2001:258 at [27]–[33]. 
10 See also, e.g. Opinion of AG Wahl in Petillo (C-371/12) EU:C:2013:652 at [40]. 
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interpretation of EU secondary law.11 In cases heard by national courts, many of the aspects concerning the 
conditions for liability and determining the amount of compensation to be awarded are, pursuant to the 
principle of national procedural autonomy, typically left for "gap-filling" national systems. Further, 
particular fields may be governed by particular norms. Nonetheless, cases on EU liability can shed light on 
the recoverability of the types of non-material harm as well as on the interpretation of the conditions for 
liability as matters of EU law.12 
 
In any event, there is no clear general EU law approach regarding how non-material harm should be 
addressed, for example as to the requirements necessary to sufficiently establish harm.13 However, it is 
possible to argue that compensability of non-material harm can, in principle, be assumed, even in contexts 
where explicit confirmation of the fact is lacking. The principle of full compensation underpins EU damages 
liability law, and that notion leads to the assumption that non-material harm is recoverable where no clear 
signs indicating otherwise exist. Further, the fields where recoverability of non-material harm has been 
expressly affirmed are increasing.14  
 
This article presents a concise overview of existing EU level case law on non-material harm, and explores 
selected substantive themes that are generally challenging in non-material harm disputes and/or which 
appear topical on the basis of recent cases. Reflecting the contours of the case law, most of the substantive 
analysis of this study is based on EU liability judgments. Overall, this contribution elucidates the treatment 
of non-material harm in EU level cases and fills a gap in the literature by systematising and commenting 
upon contemporary case law. Remarks are also made concerning prevailing ambiguities or inconsistencies, 
as well as possible future developments. 
 
In order to deal with these aims in a methodical manner, the article adopts the following structure. First, an 
overall picture of the relevant EU level case law is sketched, beginning with preliminary remarks and then 
moving on to a discussion of specific case examples. The following section (“Analysis: central substantive 
issues”) presents findings on the general treatment of non-material harm claims, and then special focus is 
given to issues that are particular to non-material harm cases or that require specific attention in the context 
                                               
11 See, e.g. fn.9 above. 
12 On the relevance of different lines of damages liability case law with respect to each other see, e.g. K. Havu, “Full, Adequate and 
Commensurate Compensation for Damages under EU Law: A Challenge for National Courts?” (2018) 43 E.L. Rev. 24, 40–41; I. 
Durant, “Causation” in H. Koziol and R. Schulze (eds), Tort Law of the European Community (Vienna: Springer, 2008), pp.47, 55–
56. See also, e.g. P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 6th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2015), pp.256–259.  
13 See also N. Reich, “The Interrelation between Rights and Duties in EU Law: Reflections on the State of Liability Law in the 
Multilevel Governance System of the Union: Is There a Need for a More Coherent Approach in European Private Law?” (2010) 29 
Yearbook of European Law 112, 131–132, 148–149. 
14 In addition to the secondary legislation and cases discussed above, see C. Heinze, Schadenersatz im Unionsprivatrecht (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2017), pp.595–602, and further 226–228, 309–310, 355–359, 415–417, 473–478. See also, e.g. A. Vaquer, “Damage” 
in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), pp.23, 39–41. 
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of non-material harm. More particularly, this part explores questions such as when does non-material harm 
necessitate monetary compensation, how are the conditions of harm and causation applied in the context of 
non-pecuniary losses and how is damage quantified and the precise amounts of compensation determined. 
The second substantive analysis section (“Further analysis: harm to reputation and distinguishing non-
material and economic damage”) provides further insights into two specific themes that are topical but which 
involve unresolved questions. First, the notion of reputational harm, a highly relevant matter and one that is 
frequently argued by claimants in recent and pending cases. And, secondly, the related, though broader, issue 
of the classification of harms as either non-material or economic, particularly as regards the elusive “border” 
between their theoretical existences. The study ends with succinct concluding remarks. 
 
Non-material harm in EU case law: an overview  
Preliminary remarks 
 
Some additional background with respect to EU law is necessary before discussing the case law in detail. EU 
law does not contain any general and exhaustive tort law regime. The only liability disputes governed solely 
by EU law are those relating to EU liability. In cases belonging to the jurisdiction of national courts 
(Member State liability and horizontal liability), the “gap-filling” national remedial and procedural rules play 
a significant role, and the existing EU law on harm compensation mainly serves the goals of substantive EU 
law and is a tool for strengthening its practical effects. The legislative competence of the EU in the field of 
private law is limited to the powers conferred in the Treaties, with art.114 TFEU—that allows harmonisation 
for the purposes of "establishment and functioning of the internal market"—being the most relevant basis for 
issuing (sector-specific) legislation dealing with damages liability. A complete EU tort law regime, that is, 
one that does not rely on national law, is not possible given the current EU competences, or indeed even 
sensible considering the practical concerns regarding the enactment and enforcement of such a regime. In 
fact, no truly self-sufficient EU legislation-based liability systems exist even in particular fields.15  
 
However, the ECJ’s judicial competence to address issues of private law remedies constitutes an avenue for 
EU law to cover even more liability questions in areas where national procedural autonomy otherwise 
prevails. In addition to interpreting EU legislation, the ECJ can discuss compensating harms as a part of 
guidance on ensuring the full effect of EU law or effective judicial protection,16 and it therefore enjoys a 
broad "de facto competence" of developing EU law on damages liability. Previously, the ECJ has handed 
down landmark rulings indicating that the possibility to obtain damages must exist in particular situations 
                                               
15 See however, e.g. Directive 85/374 concerning liability for defective products 1985 OJ L210/29; Directive 2014/104 on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the EU [2014] OJ L349/1. For further discussion regarding EU damages liability law see D. Leczykiewicz,"Compensatory 
Remedies in EU Law: The Relationship Between EU Law and National Law" in P. Giliker (ed.) Research Handbook on EU Tort 
Law (Cheltenham: EE, 2017), p.63; Heinze, Schadenersatz (2017), pp.16–106. 
16 See arts 4(3) and 19 of the Treaty on European Union, and art.47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR). 
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even though the Treaties or other legislation has not expressly provided for this.17 Further, detailed (although 
sporadic) guidance on what kind of national rules are compatible with EU law has also been provided, 
thereby developing EU law on damages liability in the process.18  
 
EU level case law that is relevant for studying liability for non-material harm, therefore, consists of different 
kinds of cases. Moreover, EU law on non-material harm can develop in different ways, that is, by means of 
sectoral legislation or ECJ guidance in different types of cases. An additional issue is that while the ECJ is 
the most authoritative interpreter of EU law, a significant portion of existing EU level judgments that touch 
upon non-material harm are those of the GC (which evaluates facts and evidence in cases concerning EU 
liability, while appeals to the ECJ are limited to questions of law19). GC judgments are, therefore, interesting 
when it comes to investigating non-pecuniary harm, but they must be studied bearing in mind that the GC 
does not possess the same authority as the ECJ when it comes to explaining the meaning of EU law. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that EU law concepts such as “non-material harm/damage” and “damage” must be 
given an autonomous and uniform interpretation based on EU law alone.20 The concept of non-material 
harm/damage has been used by the EU Courts when discussing, for example, pain or physical suffering,21 
harm to emotional well-being and the like,22 reputational damage and other harm to personality rights (of 
both natural persons and companies),23 and a “state of uncertainty” (of both natural persons and 
companies).24 Further, loss of chance is, at least in some situations, considered non-material harm under EU 
law.25 Therefore, it is observable that even under EU law, the notion of non-material harm is broad and 
covers different “qualitative” damages. As regards the actual English expressions used, “non-material” 
                                               
17 Francovich v Italian Republic (C-6/90) EU:C:1991:428; Courage Ltd v Crehan (C-453/99) EU:C:2001:465. 
18 E.g. AGM-COS.MET Srl v Suomen valtio and Lehtinen (C-470/03) EU:C:2007:213; Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA 
(C-295/04 to C-298/04) EU:C:2006:461. See also W. van Gerven, "The ECJ Case-Law as a Means of Unification of Private Law", in 
A. Hartkamp, M. Hesselink, E. Hondius, C. Joustra, E. du Perron, and M. Veldman (eds), Towards a European Civil Code, 3rd edn, 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2004), p.101. 
19 See art.256 TFEU and art.58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU. 
20 See also Nokia Corp v Wärdell (C-316/05) EU:C:2006:789 at [21]; Diamantis (C-373/97) EU:C:2000:150 at [34]; Pafatis (C-
441/93) EU:C:1996:92 at [68]–[70]. 
21 E.g. Vainker and Vainker v Parliament (T-48/01) EU:T:2004:61. See also Grifoni v EAEC (C-308/87) EU:C:1994:38. 
22 E.g. Ombudsman v Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2017:256; Chart v EEAS (T-138/14) EU:T:2015:981. 
23 E.g. Safa Nicu Sepahan Co v Council (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402; Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA (C-68/93) 
EU:C:1995:61; New Europe Consulting Ltd and Others v Commission (T-231/97) EU:T:1999:146. 
24 E.g. Campogrande v Commission (C-62/01 P) EU:C:2002:248 at [41]; Campogrande v Commission (T-136/98) EU:T:2000:281; 
Council v De Nil and Impens (C-259/96 P) EU:C:1998:224; Curto v Parliament (T-275/17) EU:T:2018:479 at [108]–[118]; 
Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:1014; Kendrion NV v EU (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48; C v Council (T-84/98) EU:T:2000:156 at 
[96]–[103]. 
25 See Farrugia v Commision (T-230/94) EU:T:1996:40 at [42]–[46]; Moat v Commission (T-13/92) EU:T:1993:22 at [44]–[49]. See 
also Castille v Commission (173/82, 157/83 and 186/84) EU:C:1986:54 at [30]–[38]. Compare to Commission v Girardot (C-348/06 
P) EU:C:2008:107; Citymo SA v Commission (T-271/04) EU:T:2007:128. 
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harm/damage and “non-pecuniary” harm/damage appear to be essentially synonyms.26 Other nomenclature is 
also seen in the case law, such as “moral prejudice”, which seems to appear in immaterial property rights 
(IPR) cases in particular.27 In the French versions of judgments, the ECJ often utilises the concept “préjudice 
moral”28 as well as, for example, “préjudice immatériel”,29 without there being any discernible legal 
difference between the phrases. 
 
Below, we look first at EU liability cases involving non-material harm and then explore a number of 
preliminary rulings. Cases are discussed according to rough “categories” but these are not that relevant per 
se, with the categorisation adopted merely to facilitate discussion. Similarly, the case examples highlighted 
are selected in order to illustrate the variety of legal issues that emerge in non-material harm disputes, but the 
goal is not to present an exhaustive list of relevant cases. More elaborate analysis of the substantive 
questions follows this overview.  
 
EU liability cases 
Staff cases 
 
Cases involving EU officials (or their recruitment procedures) often touch upon non-material harm such as 
harm to mental well-being or to career. In Hectors, for example, the claimant argued that they had suffered 
non-material harm due to the lack of transparency related to an appointment procedure. Nevertheless, the 
damages claim was dismissed because the annulment of the contested decision was considered adequate 
compensation for the damage.30 Generally, the issue of whether the annulment of a decision or other measure 
suffices as compensation for non-material harm reoccurs in staff cases.31 
 
There are also staff cases that, for example, particularly underline the obligation of the claimant to provide 
information and evidence on the nature and extent of the damage.32 For example in Girardot, the claimant 
requested compensation for deterioration of mental health, depression, and physical harm caused by the 
                                               
26 See Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2017:256; Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402; Girardot (C-348/06 P) EU:C:2008:107; Wood 
(C-164/07) EU:C:2008:321; Parliament v Reynolds (C-111/02 P) EU:C:2004:265. 
27 E.g. Liffers v Producciones Mandarina SL and Mediaset España Comunicación SA (C-99/15) EU:C:2016:173; Nikolajeva v Multi 
Protect OÜ (C-280/15) EU:C:2016:467. 
28 Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2017:256; Girardot (C-348/06 P) EU:C:2008:107; Wood (C-164/07) EU:C:2008:321; Reynolds (C-
111/02 P) EU:C:2004:265; Liffers (C-99/15) EU:C:2016:173. 
29 Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402. 
30 Hectors v Parliament (C-150/03 P) EU:C:2004:555 at [55]–[57], [61]–[62]; Hectors v Parliament (T-181/01) EU:T:2003:13. 
31 E.g. Culin v Commission (C-343/87) EU:C:1990:49 at [25]–[29]; Alba Aguilera v EEAS (T-119/17) EU:T:2018:183 at [50]–[51]; 
PB v Commission (T-609/16) EU:T:2017:910 at [97]–[98]; CW v Parliament (T-742/16 RENV) EU:T:2017:338 at [64]–[67]; 
Campogrande (C-62/01 P) EU:C:2002:248 at [40]–[44]; François v Commission (T-307/01) EU:T:2004:180; C (T-84/98) 
EU:T:2000:156 at [101]–[103]. 
32 E.g. Gordon v Commission (T-175/04) EU:T:2007:38 at [41]–[44]; Gordon v Commission (C-198/07 P) EU:C:2008:761 at [60]–
[63]. The claim for damages (harm to career, health and well-being) was inadmissible because it was unsubstantiated. 
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unlawful rejection of her applications. However, no evidence—such as a medical certificate—had been 
produced regarding the existence of the harm and therefore it was not possible to grant compensation.33 
 
“Sanctions list” cases (foreign and security policy) 
 
A noteworthy category of non-material harm case law is the so-called “sanctions list” cases, which concern 
EU non-contractual liability related to restrictive measures adopted in view of a problematic situation in a 
particular country.34 In Safa Nicu, the GC found that the unlawful (unjustified) adoption and maintenance of 
the restrictive measures placed upon a company caused it recoverable non-material harm, marking the first 
time in which monetary compensation for such damage was awarded in a sanctions case. The claimant 
argued that they had suffered damage to personality rights and reputational harm. The GC stated that the 
annulment of the company’s entry on the restrictive measures list was such as to limit the amount of 
compensation,35 but could not represent full reparation for the harm suffered. The GC paid attention to, inter 
alia, the gravity of the breach of EU law, its duration, and how the unjustified measures affected the 
behaviour of third parties, and set the amount of compensation ex aequo et bono at €50 000.36 The ECJ 
(Grand Chamber) confirmed the outcome.37 
 
In Bank Mellat, the ECJ clarified that restrictive measures of general application (concerning an entire 
business sector) cannot be considered likely to cause, as regards an individual operator, clear non-material 
harm in the form of damage to reputation.38 Further, in Bredenkamp, the claimants were lawfully included on 
a list of targeted persons and entities and, therefore, the conditions for damages liability of the EU were not 
met.39 
                                               
33 Girardot v Commission (T-10/02) EU:T:2006:148 at [133]–[137]; Girardot (C-348/06 P) EU:C:2008:107 at [30], [87]–[92]. 
34 Such as Iran (see Regulation 961/2010 on restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation 423/2007 [2010] OJ L281/1), 
or Zimbabwe (see Regulation 314/2004 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Zimbabwe [2004] OJ L55/1). The 
restrictive measures meant in this context are those imposed on certain persons and entities and involve, e.g. the freezing of the funds 
or economic resources belonging to members of the government of a particular country as well as to any natural or legal persons or 
entities associated with them. The target persons and entities are listed in annexes to EU secondary legislation instruments. See, e.g. 
Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 at [1]–[5]; Bredenkamp and Others v Council (T-66/14) EU:T:2016:430 at [1]–[9]. 
35 Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [87]. See also Abdulrahim v Council and Commission (C-239/12 P) EU:C:2013:331 at 
[72]–[74], [83]; Commission and Others v Kadi (C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P) EU:C:2013:518 at [134]. 
36 Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [78]–[92]. 
37 Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 at [47]–[54], [101]–[111]. Some non-material harm arguments were presented for the first 
time before the ECJ and were therefore inadmissible. The ECJ emphasised that once the GC has found the existence of damage, it 
alone has jurisdiction to assess the means and extent of compensation. See also Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others (C-136/92 
P) EU:C:1994:211. 
38 Bank Mellat v Council (C-430/16 P) EU:C:2018:668 at [54]–[61]. The ECJ cited Abdulrahim (C-239/12 P) EU:C:2013:331 
distinguishing the factual circumstances of the cases (in Abdulrahim, the issue was being associated with terrorist activities).  
39 Bredenkamp (T-66/14) EU:T:2016:430. It should be noted that even the justified and legal inclusion of a person or company on a 
sanctions list can be harmful. Nevertheless, in case of legal and/or general measures, the harm is not prima facie recoverable. 
Whether the EU can in some situations incur damages liability for harm caused by a piece of legislation which in itself is not 
	 8	
 
Finally, a natural person argued in the case of Jannatian that certain unlawful restrictive measures deprived 
him of his right to property and freedom of movement, and that a travel ban imposed upon him denied him 
the possibility of visiting his daughter in another country, thereby infringing his right to private and family 
life. Additionally, it was impossible for him to carry out bank transactions in his own name. At the hearing, 
the claimant also stated that the restrictive measures had damaged his reputation. The GC did not find any 
actual damage, and underlined that a finding that the restrictive measures were unlawful is in any event 
capable of constituting a form of reparation for non-material harm.40 
 
Cases concerning excessive duration of court or administrative proceedings 
 
The EU Courts have recently decided some interesting cases concerning EU non-contractual liability for 
harm concerning the GC’s failure to adjudicate in a reasonable time in competition matters. The GC has 
awarded, and the ECJ affirmed, damages for non-material harm related to the prolonged state of uncertainty 
in which company claimants found themselves during the excessive duration of court proceedings.41 
Compensation for harm to reputation has, however, not been granted in these cases.42 There are also cases 
that discuss the excessive length of administrative proceedings and non-material harm.43 
 
Other EU liability cases 
 
Moving onto other cases, Staelen boiled down to the question of what counts as recoverable non-material 
harm in the context of EU liability. The European Ombudsman had mishandled a complaint, but the ECJ 
(Grand Chamber) stated that the alleged damage, such as loss of confidence in the office of the Ombudsman, 
could not be considered recoverable—the GC had erred in law in this respect. Nonetheless, the ECJ found 
                                               
unlawful is not entirely clear. In any event, such liability would be subject to stringent conditions, such as the unusual and special 
nature of the harm. See FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission (C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P) EU:C:2008:476 at [164]–[188], 
and Craig and de Búrca, EU Law (2015), pp.595–597. 
40 Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86. The impairment of freedom to travel was outside the scope of GC’s jurisdiction, and the 
claim regarding reputation had been raised out of time. 
41 In Kendrion, €6000 was awarded: Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48 at [126]–[135]; Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:1014. In 
Gascogne, the awarded sum was €5000 for each of the claimants: Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH and Others v EU (T-577/14) 
EU:T:2017:1 at [157]–[165]; EU v Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH and Others (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:1013. 
42 The GC found that the damage to reputation had not been proven and that in any event possible harm to reputation would be 
remedied by the finding of the breach of the obligation to adjudicate in a reasonable time: Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48 at 
[122]–[130]; Gascogne (T-577/14) EU:T:2017:1 at [151]–[154]. The decisions given on appeal did not affect the treatment: 
Gascogne (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:1013 at [57]–[60]; Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:1014. Generally, 
significant reputational harm due to the excessive duration of court proceedings should be considered unlikely, since being involved 
in competition infringement proceedings in the first place is likely the issue that matters most in terms of company image. See also 
Guardian Europe v EU (T-673/15) EU:T:2017:377 at [42]–[43], [142]–[148], [108]–[115] (an appeal is pending before the ECJ). 
43 E.g. Luccacioni v Commission (T-551/16) EU:T:2017:751. See also Curto (T-275/17) EU:T:2018:479. 
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that €7000 was a suitable monetary compensation for psychological harm experienced as a result of the way 
in which the Ombudsman dealt with the complaint.44 
 
Additional EU liability cases include Idromacchine, which concerned a state aid investigation by the 
Commission, breach of professional secrecy, and harm to the reputation of a company together with its 
shareholders and directors. The GC awarded a “fair compensation” of €20 000 for the non-material harm 
suffered by the company, but noted that the shareholders and directors did not prove any harm.45 In Sviluppo, 
the ECJ noted that damage alleged to have resulted from a decision reducing regional development aid to a 
company was not unusual or special and therefore there was no need to rule on liability for them; the 
company had claimed compensation for economic and reputational harm.46 Further, in the case 
Agriconsulting, for example, which concerned tendering for public service contracts, an allegedly unfairly 
excluded company claimed damages for “unfair pressure”, but the claim was dismissed as unsubstantiated.47 
Non-material harm discussions can also be found in other EU public procurement cases.48 
 
Preliminary rulings: examples and interesting questions 
 
Some recent preliminary rulings by the ECJ discuss “moral prejudice” in the context of compensation for 
IPR infringements (horizontal liability). In Liffers, the ECJ affirmed that moral prejudice is relevant for 
determining full compensation under Directive 2004/48.49 In Nikolajeva, it was noted that the narrower 
notion of “reasonable compensation” under art.9(3) of Regulation 207/2009 referred to recovering profits but 
excluded moral prejudice.50 These rulings do not discuss the issues of determining or establishing non-
material harm in detail and leave many matters for national laws and courts to resolve. IPR rulings can even 
be found that touch upon, for example, “damage to reputation” or “damaging reputation”, but do not explore 
non-material harm from the standpoint of damages liability.51 
 
In the consumer case Leitner, the ECJ confirmed that the general concept of “damage”, as used in Directive 
90/314 on package travel, encompassed non-material harm. The ECJ underlined that the purpose of the 
                                               
44 Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2017:256; Staelen v Ombudsman (T-217/11) EU:T:2015:238. See also the Opinion of AG Wahl in 
Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2016:823 at [112]–[114]. 
45 Idromacchine and Others v Commission (T-88/09) EU:T:2011:641 at [63]–[76], [85]–[94]. Judgment given on appeal did not alter 
the outcome: Idromacchine and Others v Commission (C-34/12 P) EU:C:2013:552. 
46 Sviluppo (C-414/08 P) EU:C:2010:165 at [138]–[142]. 
47 Agriconsulting v Commission (T-570/13) EU:T:2016:40 at [120]–[125]; Agriconsulting v Commission (C-198/16 P) 
EU:C:2017:784. 
48 E.g. New Europe (T-231/97) EU:T:1999:146; Embassy Limousines & Services (T-203/96) EU:T:1998:302. 
49 Liffers (C-99/15) EU:C:2016:173; Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L157/45, 
art.13(1). See also Oławska Telewizja Kablowa (C-367/15) EU:C:2017:36 at [30]. 
50 Nikolajeva (C-280/15) EU:C:2016:467; Regulation 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark [2009] OJ L78/1. 
51 E.g. Junek Europ-Vertrieb GmbH (C-642/16) EU:C:2018:322; Boehringer Ingelheim and Others (C-348/04) EU:C:2007:249. 
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Directive was to offer protection to tourists, and non-material harm in the form of loss of enjoyment of 
holiday could not be excluded in the light of that goal.52 
 
The case law also contains several motor vehicle insurance preliminary rulings that discuss secondary 
legislation and non-material harm. For example, the ECJ has confirmed that the notion of “(personal) injury” 
in Directive 72/166 and Directive 90/232 includes non-material harm, such as harm to psychological well-
being.53 Nevertheless, the rulings in this area focus on the harmonisation of liability insurance legislation and 
underline the relevance of national law in issues of civil liability related to traffic accidents,54 with the result 
that the value of the existing traffic accident rulings for evaluating the recoverability of non-material harm 
under EU law is minor. 
 
In principle, even Member State liability could encompass non-material harm. Prima facie, the fact that the 
conditions for EU non-contractual liability and Member State liability have converged—together with the 
justifications presented for this development—can be understood as pointing to this conclusion.55 
Nevertheless, EU level Member State liability cases touching upon non-material harm are few.56 Notably, in 
his Opinion in Schmidberger, AG Jacobs stated that the issue of whether Member State liability could also 
extend to non-material harm has not been resolved.57 To this author’s knowledge, there are no rulings that 
explicitly provide that compensation must be provided for non-material harm.58  
 
Moreover, the ECJ does not usually expressly and elaborately discuss the protective scope in the context of 
Member State liability. Some commentators have even pointed out that once the Francovich liability is, after 
                                               
52 Leitner (C-168/00) EU:C:2002:163 at [19]–[24]; Directive 90/314 on package travel, package holidays and package tours [1990] 
OJ L158/59. Inclusion of non-material harm was expressly noted in the new package travel Directive 2015/2302: see fn.8 above. 
53 Drozdovs v Baltikums AAS (C-277/12) EU:C:2013:685 at [36]–[48]; Haasová (C-22/12) EU:C:2013:692 at [46]–[59]; Directive 
72/166 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [1972] OJ L103/1; Directive 90/232 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles 
(Third Directive) [1990] OJ L129/33. See also AG Jääskinen’s Joint Opinion in Haasová (C-22/12) and Drozdovs (C-277/12) 
EU:C:2013:471. 
54 E.g. Drozdovs (C-277/12) EU:C:2013:6 at [31]. The rules on civil liability have not been harmonised. 
55 See Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm v Commission (C-352/98 P) EU:C:2000:361 at [41]. The para. can be seen as 
suggesting that even the protective scope should be the same under EU liability and Member State liability. 
56 See also R. Rebhahn, “Non-contractual Liability in Damages of Member States for Breach of Community 
Law” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), pp.179, 205; M. Wissink,“Overview” in Tort Law of the European 
Community (2008), pp.341, 358. 
57 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Schmidberger (C-112/00) EU:C:2002:437 at [34] (the AG's fn.16). 
58 See also M. Dougan, “Addressing Issues of Protective Scope within the Francovich Right to Reparation” (2017) 13 European 
Constitutional Law Review 124, 152–155. The author highlights, e.g. the economic harm-centred discussion in Leth v Austria (C-
420/11) EU:C:2013:166, noting the absence of comments on non-material interests. Consider also Wells (C-201/02) EU:C:2004:12 at 
[65]–[70]: Member States are required to make good any harm caused by failure to carry out an environmental impact assessment, 
but the types of interests protected are not discussed. 
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a superficial analysis, found generally applicable, the protective scope can be defined “indirectly” through 
sporadic considerations related to the details of liability—although this is not particularly logical. Matters 
such as applying the causal link condition gain notable practical relevance, but are also significantly left for 
the national courts to resolve guided by the mere “outer limits” determined by EU law, for example the 
procedural autonomy principles of effectiveness and equivalence, and art.47 of the EUCFR.59 Therefore, 
even though the recoverability of non-material harm under Member State liability can be seen as a 
reasonable starting point, EU law in this area is not entirely clear and may also develop by means of 
“secondary” clarifications concerning the limits related to the application of national law.  
 
Generally in preliminary rulings, the ECJ could find, for example, that the obligations related to ensuring the 
full effect of EU law or effective judicial protection signify (under certain circumstances) that non-material 
harm must be compensated for—and even provide further guidance regarding the details of such liability. 
The existing preliminary rulings, however, mostly seem to deal with non-material harm as an issue related to 
interpreting the scope of particular secondary legislation provisions.60 
 
Analysis: central substantive issues 
Preliminary remarks 
  
Preliminary rulings touching upon non-material harm illustrate significant reliance on Member State laws as 
regards resolving damages disputes. In EU liability cases, varying amounts of substantive reasoning can be 
found, but monetary damages not being awarded is in any event a common outcome. Numerous cases exist 
where claims are not substantiated or supported with sufficient evidence61 or where the conditions of liability 
are not met.62 One reason for denying compensation has been that what has been claimed to be non-material 
damage is mere “normal inconvenience”, which does not constitute recoverable harm.63 Moreover, monetary 
compensation is often not considered necessary to correct (possible) non-material harm.64 Disputes have also 
                                               
59 See Dougan, “Protective Scope” (2017) European Constitutional Law Review 124. See also P. Aalto, Public Liability in EU Law: 
Brasserie, Bergaderm and Beyond (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp.158–176, 198–202. With respect to case law, see fn.58 above 
and, e.g. Danfoss A/S (C-94/10) EU:C:2011:674 at [30]–[39]; AGM-COS.MET (C-470/03) EU:C:2007:213 at [77]–[96]. 
60 See also fn.9 above. 
61 E.g. Buono and Others v Commission (C-12/13 P and C-13/13 P) EU:C:2014:2284; Inalca and Cremonini (C-460/09 P) 
EU:C:2013:111 at [99]–[104]; Girardot (C-348/06 P) EU:C:2008:107 at [30], [87]–[92]; Girardot (T-10/02) EU:T:2006:148 at 
[133]–[137]; Gordon (C-198/07 P) EU:C:2008:761 at [60]–[63]; Gordon (T-175/04) EU:T:2007:38; Agriconsulting (T-570/13) 
EU:T:2016:40 at [120]–[125]. 
62 E.g. Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission (C-419/08 P) EU:C:2010:147; USFSPEI v Parliament and 
Council  (T-75/14) EU:T:2017:813 at [41], [126]–[127]; Paulini v ECB (T-764/16) EU:T:2018:101; CJ v ECDC (T-692/16) 
EU:T:2017:894; OZ v EIB (T-607/16 ) EU:T:2017:495; Oikonomopoulos v Commission (T-483/13) EU:T:2016:421 at [244]–[247]; 
TEAM v Commission (T-13/96) EU:T:1998:254 at [77]. 
63 See Sviluppo (C-414/08 P) EU:C:2010:165 at [139]–[142]; Idromacchine (T-88/09) EU:T:2011:641 at [91]–[93]. See also Staelen 
(C-337/15 P) EU:C:2017:256 at [91]–[95]; Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48 at [126]–[128]. 
64 See also the following section. 
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arisen where damages have been claimed for harm suffered by others—such as employees of company 
claimants—without officially representing, in procedural terms, those other actors, with the compensation 
being declined for this reason.65 
 
The cases reviewed suggest that certain key issues related to finding liability and awarding compensation are 
worthy of further analysis. Generally, the notions of defining, valuating and correcting recoverable non-
material harm are necessarily difficult to deal with, and EU level judgments illustrate that the legal state 
regarding these issues remains relatively open. The EU Courts’ detailed considerations of whether and when 
financial reparation is necessary are, therefore, explored below. Following this, the interpretation and 
application of the conditions of harm and causation and the reasoning of the EU Courts as regards these 
elements of liability is dealt with. Lastly, attention is paid to the assessment or quantification of damage as 
well as decisions regarding the amount of compensation—inherently tricky matters in cases involving non-
pecuniary damage and which are, interestingly, discussed only superficially by the EU Courts.  
 
When is monetary compensation required? 
 
Under EU law, non-material harm is often considered sufficiently compensated without monetary reparation. 
This applies, in particular, to staff cases, but similar reasoning can also be seen in other (EU liability) cases. 
The frequent finding that financial compensation is unnecessary is a particular feature of non-material harm 
case law,66 and therefore explored here in detail. 
 
The ECJ stated in the staff case of Culin that non-material harm is normally remedied by the annulment of 
the contested measure so that a claim for damages “serves no purpose”, but in the circumstances of this 
particular case, a symbolic compensation of one French franc was appropriate. The decision contested in the 
case had rejected the claimant’s candidature for a promotion. A related document drafted by the Commission 
had contained an unfavourable assessment of the claimant’s abilities, and the remarks proved to be incorrect. 
The assessment—which the ECJ considered to be offensive in itself—had been disseminated within the 
Commission. According to the ECJ, the non-material harm caused could be considered independent of the 
                                               
65 E.g. Holistic Innovation Institute v Commission (T-468/14) EU:T:2016:296; Gascogne (T-577/14) EU:T:2017:1 at [145]–[150]; 
Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48 at [117]–[120]. It should be noted that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been 
willing to consider, e.g. the stress and pressure caused to employees and members of management while contemplating compensation 
for non-material harm to legal entities. See Comingersoll SA v Portugal (35382/97, 6 April 2000). Note also Freedom and 
Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v Turkey (23885/94, 8 December 1999). The approach adopted by the ECtHR may be a reason for 
including arguments on employees’ and directors’ psychological pressure when companies claim damages before the EU Courts. 
More broadly, there are also numerous other EU cases where procedural issues have led to a denial of compensation, e.g. Safa Nicu 
(C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 at [108]–[109]; Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86 at [61]. See also Buono (C-12/13 P and C-13/13 P) 
EU:C:2014:2284. 
66 Compensation other than monetary may also be sufficient in other cases (see fn.78 below), but non-material harm appears to be the 
only type of damage that the EU Courts repeatedly find sufficiently corrected without financial reparation.   
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mere contested decision, and could not be fully remedied either by the publication of a correction or by 
quashing the rejection.67  
 
In the case of M, the GC found that a Commission official’s rights had been breached and reputation, 
including professional image, tarnished by the publication of a European Ombudsman decision containing 
his name—compensation of €10 000 was therefore necessary.68 Compensation of €8000 was also awarded in 
François, where the claimant argued having suffered damage to reputation and honour and of prolonged 
state of uncertainty in the context of lengthy disciplinary proceedings. Several accusations made against the 
claimant proved to be incorrect, and the conduct of the Commission, the defendant, had not been entirely 
appropriate.69 
 
The case law illustrates that (incorrect) assessments concerning a person’s abilities or conduct that are likely 
to cause harm and are widely distributed can constitute a particular circumstance that justifies monetary 
compensation.70 In contrast, where the alleged harm does not appear serious and relates directly to the 
contested measure itself, and where there are no other particular circumstances that would justify 
compensation, the sufficiency of the mere annulment of an unlawful measure is the main rule.71 Accordingly, 
staff cases where claims for monetary reparation have been rejected are numerous.72 
 
The mere annulment or finding of illegality has also been deemed sufficient in other areas.73 The ECJ 
underlined in the sanctions case Abdulrahim that the recognition of unlawfulness of the contested measure 
could constitute “a form of reparation for the non-material harm”.74 Safa Nicu clarified that monetary 
compensation is not, however, automatically excluded. Because the allegation that the claimant was involved 
in nuclear proliferation affected the way that third parties behaved towards it, a state of affairs that lasted for 
years, the eventual finding of unlawfulness of the restrictive measures was considered insufficient to fully 
                                               
67 Culin (C-343/87) EU:C:1990:49 at [25]–[29]. Compare to, e.g. Hectors (C-150/03 P) EU:C:2004:555 at [55]–[61]. 
68 M v Ombudsman (T-412/05) EU:T:2008:397 at [146]–[158]. 
69 François (T-307/01) EU:T:2004:180. Monetary reparation was also considered necessary in, e.g. C (T-84/98) EU:T:2000:156; CW 
(T-742/16 RENV) EU:T:2017:338. 
70 See also Josefsson v Parliament (T-566/16) EU:T:2018:278 at [53]–[57] (an appeal is pending before the ECJ); Dejaiffe v OHIM 
(T-223/99) EU:T:2000:292 at [91]–[94]. 
71 See also DD v FRA (T-742/15 P) EU:T:2017:528 at [72]–[94]; Opinion of AG Wahl in Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2016:823 at 
[108]–[112]. 
72 E.g. Campogrande (C-62/01 P) EU:C:2002:248 at [20]–[22], [40]–[44]; Campogrande (T-136/98) EU:T:2000:281; Neirinck v 
Commission (C-17/07 P) EU:C:2008:134 at [95]–[98]; Alba Aguilera (T-119/17) EU:T:2018:183 at [50]–[51] (an appeal is pending 
before the ECJ); Hochbaum and Rawes v Commission (44/85, 77/85, 294/85 and 295/85) EU:C:1987:348 at [22]. 
73 See European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v OHIM (T-299/11) EU:T:2015:757 at [155]; EUIPO v European Dynamics and 
Others (C‐677/15 P) EU:C:2017:998; Gascogne (T-577/14) EU:T:2017:1 at [151]–[159]; Gascogne (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) 
EU:C:2018:1013 at [60]–[62]. Note also Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2017:256 at [129]–[131]. 
74 Abdulrahim (C-239/12 P) EU:C:2013:331 at [71]–[72]. 
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remedy the harm.75 The GC also pointed out that the annulment of the measures is likely to receive less 
attention than their original adoption, which signifies that the annulment would not necessarily affect the 
attitude of third parties.76  
 
Overall, the EU Courts evaluate the need for financial compensation on a case-by-case basis, and it can 
therefore remain somewhat unclear to future claimants whether the circumstances of their case warrant 
monetary reparation. However, the successful award of damages is likely facilitated by arguments and 
possible evidence that emphasise: a) the exceptional and severe nature of the non-material harm; b) that the 
harm goes beyond that caused by the mere existence of the contested measure77; and c) that the annulment of 
the contested measure is in any case incapable of entirely undoing the negative effects suffered.  
 
In the current state of EU law, when monetary reparation should or could be considered unnecessary in cases 
heard by national courts cannot be exhaustively determined. It is possible that clarifications made in the 
context of EU liability have implications for other types of cases, but in the absence of express statements to 
that effect, any impacts will remain unclear. Interestingly, some preliminary rulings not dealing with non-
material harm do indicate that monetary compensation is not always necessary. Nonetheless, guidance by the 
ECJ on this theme is minimal and leaves many matters to be resolved by national courts.78  
 
Relevant harm and causation 
 
The issue of how the conditions of harm and causation are applied in the context of non-material damage 
deserves particular attention. Due to the abstract nature of non-pecuniary damage, it is often ambiguous how 
the existence and extent of relevant harm should be shown and what suffices for finding liability. Under EU 
law generally, the claimant must establish harm, a causal link between the wrongful conduct and the harm, 
and the extent of the harm.79 Additionally, the damage must be actual and certain (or the like) and specific.80 
                                               
75 Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 at [47]–[53], [86]–[92], [101]–[107]; Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986. 
76 Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [88]. Also in, e.g. Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86, the GC particularly focused on the 
reactions of third parties (at [62]–[66]). 
77 See Culin (C-343/87) EU:C:1990:49 at [25]–[29]; PB (T-609/16) EU:T:2017:910 at [97]–[98]. However, it should be noted that 
the requirements of a sufficiently direct causal link and of harm that is relatively independent of the contested measure might not be 
easily met simultaneously. 
78 E.g. Fuß v Stadt Halle (C-429/09) EU:C:2010:717; Palmisani v INPS (C-261/95) EU:C:1997:351; Maso v INPS (C-373/95) 
EU:C:1997:353. For discussion see Havu, “Commensurate Compensation” (2018) E.L. Rev. 41–42; M. Dougan, National Remedies 
before the Court of Justice: Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), pp.256–258. 
79 E.g. Giordano v Commission (C-611/12 P) EU:C:2014:2282 at [35]–[36]; Blackspur DIY and Others v Council and Commission 
(C-362/95 P) EU:C:1997:401 at [31]. 
80 E.g. Giordano (C-611/12 P) EU:C:2014:2282 at [36]; Agraz and Others v Commission (C-243/05 P) EU:C:2006:708 at [26]–[27]; 
Hansson v Jungpflanzen Grünewald GmbH (C-481/14) EU:C:2016:419 at [35]; De Nil (C-259/96 P) EU:C:1998:224; Münchener 
Import-Weinkellerei Binderer v Commission (147/83) EU:C:1985:26; Roquette Frères v Commission (26/74) EU:C:1976:69; SA 
Métallurgique Hainaut-Sambre v High Authority (4/65) EU:C:1965:130. 
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In some cases, it is also expressly provided that the damage must be quantifiable.81 With respect to details of 
causation, EU law is to some extent obscure. Cases on EU liability and on Member State liability illustrate 
the requirements of a “direct causal link” (or the like), but not consistently. Further, what is meant by 
“direct” is not entirely clear.82 Whether and what kind of directness is required is also debatable in other 
contexts.83 In any event, (direct) causal link means, roughly, that the wrongful conduct is an immediate and 
exclusive, or at least necessary, cause of the harm alleged.84 
 
Establishing the conditions for liability is necessary even when the dispute concerns non-material harm and 
the amount of compensation could be, in the end, decided based on fair evaluation.85 Confirmation of the 
amount of compensation occurs only after a finding of liability to pay damages in the first place. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties that arise when deciding upon a suitable amount of compensation for non-
material harm are already present in proving and evaluating the presence of the conditions for liability. This 
is because the issues of whether there is actual and relevant harm and how to quantify it or value it in 
monetary terms are closely related. The EU Courts recognise this and balance the challenges of establishing 
abstract harm against the general conditions for liability. As a result, the Courts accept that no precise or 
scientific proof of non-material harm is necessarily available, and may be, at least in some cases, relatively 
lenient in their evaluation of whether harm and a causal link are established. Nonetheless, a mere allegation 
of having suffered non-pecuniary damage does not suffice.86 
 
The EU Courts evaluate the sufficiency of information and proof of non-material harm on a case-by-case 
basis, and the extent of the judicial reasoning in the judgments varies. In some EU liability cases, damages 
claims for non-material harm are dismissed summarily because of a lack of information and proof regarding 
                                               
81 E.g. Brazzelli Lualdi (C-136/92) EU:C:1994:211 at [42]; Brazzelli Lualdi v Commission (T-17/89) EU:T:1992:25. 
82 See Francovich (C-6/90) EU:C:1991:428; Perillo v Commission (T-7/96) EU:T:1997:94; Dillenkofer v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (C-178/94) EU:C:1996:375; Bergaderm (C-352/98 P) EU:C:2000:361; Trubowest (C-419/08 P) EU:C:2010:147; Safa 
Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402. See also M. Weitenberg, “Terminology” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), pp.309, 
335–340; Durant, “Causation” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), pp.64–67, and, e.g. A. Biondi and M. Farley, The 
Right to Damages in European Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2009), pp.55–60. 
83 See Kone AG v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG (C-557/12) EU:C:2014:1317. Compare to Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV (C-199/11) 
EU:C:2012:684 at [65]. 
84 E.g. Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v Skatteministeriet (C-319/96) EU:C:1998:429; Trubowest (C-419/08 P) EU:C:2010:147 at 
[53]–[64]. See further on causation and relevant damage Havu, “Commensurate Compensation” (2018) E.L. Rev. 37–41; C. Van 
Dam, European Tort Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2013), pp.321–324, 359–360, 371–372. See also K. Oliphant, “The Nature and 
Assessment of Damages” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), pp.241, 256–271. 
85 See also Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2016:658 at [61]–[66]; RX-II M v EMEA (C-197/09) 
EU:C:2009:804 at [58]–[59]; Vaquer, “Damage” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), pp.27–31, 39–42; Oliphant, 
“Damages” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), pp.243–244. 
86 In addition to the examples discussed below, see De Nil (C-259/96 P) EU:C:1998:224 at [25]–[27]; Idromacchine (C-34/12 P) 
EU:C:2013:552 at [97]; Opinion of AG Wahl in Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2016:823 at [108], [114]; Kendrion (T-479/14) 
EU:T:2017:48 at [122]–[125]. 
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the existence of actual and certain harm.87 Nonetheless, and importantly, some judgments illustrate that in 
situations where proving the fact and extent of the alleged harm is not possible, it is sufficient to show that 
the wrongful conduct was, because of its gravity, of such a nature that it was prone to cause non-material 
harm.88 
 
The EU Courts and AGs often emphasise the idea that the causal connection to non-material harm should be 
(sufficiently) direct or the alleged non-material damage a (sufficiently) direct consequence of the wrongful 
conduct.89 There are also, however, non-material harm cases where the directness of the causal link does not 
receive particular attention.90 In any event, the EU Courts have famously declined compensation for indirect 
and “distant” non-material harm, such as that suffered by family members of an accident victim (EU 
liability).91 Receiving compensation for “distant” non-pecuniary harm is unlikely in other contexts as well. 
Even though the recoverability of consequential and indirect non-material damage would in principle be 
accepted, proving sufficient or likely causation would constitute a considerable practical challenge. 
 
Requiring a clear and simple link between wrongful conduct and non-pecuniary damage is understandable. 
Other solutions would easily encourage opportunistic litigation.92 Nevertheless, the fact that the alleged harm 
is non-material in nature does not necessarily signify that the evaluation concerning the sufficiency of a 
causal link or existence of relevant damage would be stricter than is the case with, for example, economic 
                                               
87 E.g. Girardot (C-348/06 P) EU:C:2008:107 at [30], [87]–[92]; Girardot (T-10/02) EU:T:2006:148 at [133]–[137] (no medical 
statements); Agriconsulting (T-570/13) EU:T:2016:40 at [121]–[123]; Agriconsulting (C-198/16 P) EU:C:2017:784 (the claimant 
company merely stated it had suffered “unfair pressure”). See also Idromacchine (T-88/09) EU:T:2011:641 at [87]–[94]; 
Idromacchine (C-34/12 P) EU:C:2013:552; Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86 at [59]–[66]; CJ (T-692/16) EU:T:2017:894 at 
[128]–[129] (an appeal is pending before the ECJ); Farrugia (T-230/94) EU:T:1996:40 at [40]–[46]. 
88 E.g. SELEX Sistemi Integrati v Commission (C-481/07 P) EU:C:2009:461 at [37]–[38]; Castille (173/82, 157/83 and 186/84) 
EU:C:1986:54 at [30]–[38]; Guardian (T-673/15) EU:T:2017:377 at [144]–[147]; BAI v Commission (T-230/95) EU:T:1999:11 at 
[29]–[40]; Embassy (T-203/96) EU:T:1998:302. See also S.L. Kalėda, “Claims for Damages in EU Procurement and Effective 
Protection of Individual Rights” (2014) 39 E.L. Rev. 193, 202–206; Vaquer, “Damage” in Tort Law of the European Community 
(2008), p.29. 
89 E.g. Trubowest (C-419/08 P) EU:C:2010:147; Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2017:256 at [127]; Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) 
EU:C:2017:402 at [61]–[62]; Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:1014 at [52]; Opinion of AG Wahl in Staelen (C-337/15 P) 
EU:C:2016:823 at [119] (citing CAS Succhi di Frutta v Commission (C-497/06 P) EU:C:2009:273); Opinion of AG Wahl in 
Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:612 at [54]–[61]; Chart (T-138/14) EU:T:2015:981; TEAM (T-13/96) EU:T:1998:254 at [74]–
[77]; Oikonomopoulos (T-483/13) EU:T:2016:421 at [244]–[247]. 
90 E.g. CJ (T-692/16) EU:T:2017:894 at [124]–[128]. 
91 Leussink and Others v Commission (169/83 and 136/84) EU:C:1986:371 at [21]–[22]. See similarly Vainker (T-48/01) 
EU:T:2004:61 at [206]–[212]. See also Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2016:658 at [112]; Trubowest (C-
419/08 P) EU:C:2010:147 at [53]–[64]. For discussion see Van Dam, Tort (2013) pp.371–372; Durant, “Causation” in Tort Law of 
the European Community (2008), pp.65–66; W. Van Gerven, J. Lever and P. Larouche, Cases, Materials and Text on National, 
Supranational and International Tort Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), pp.894–899.  
92 See also Opinion of AG Wahl in Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2016:823 at [108]. Consider also comparative remarks: C. von Bar, 
The Common European Law of Torts, Volume Two (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp.169–170. 
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harm. Indeed, there are EU liability cases where compensation is awarded for non-material harm but denied 
for other types of alleged damage.93 One reason contributing to this could be that evaluating the presence of 
non-material harm is highly casuistic, while in the context of other damages it is generally clearer what one 
must prove in order to be successful in a compensation claim. Moreover, presenting proof is feasible in the 
context of (more) material harms,94 while this is often not the case with non-material harm.95 Therefore, the 
EU Courts may be convinced by the information provided concerning non-material harm, as well as the 
relevant causal link, but find proof of other harms and their connection to the wrongful conduct 
insufficient.96  
 
Overall, the manner in which the EU Courts will interpret and apply the conditions of harm and causation in 
a particular case can be challenging to foresee as hints of both stringent and lenient approaches to evaluating 
the presence of these conditions emerge from the case law. A matter that further complicates the analysis of 
non-material harm judgments, as well as the issue of their broader relevance, is that the Courts “mix” or 
intertwine the issues of conditions for liability, existence and recoverability of harm, need for monetary 
compensation, and assessing the final amount of reparation. The conclusions concerning these matters are 
often presented in such a manner that it is difficult or impossible to discern what the detailed evaluations 
related to each of the individual matters are.97 This is a problem from the standpoint of legal certainty and 
predictability. 
 
Quantifying the harm and the amount of compensation 
 
Particularly relevant issues in the context of non-pecuniary damage are those of quantifying or assessing the 
harm and deciding upon the amount of compensation. This is because the harm is, by definition, not easy to 
value in terms of money. There are at least two interesting questions in this area: first, how do the EU Courts 
treat the parties’ quantification attempts (or the lack of them); and, secondly, how do the Courts justify the 
compensation amounts awarded. The relevance of these questions is magnified by the fact that the notion of 
                                               
93 E.g. Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:1014; Gascogne (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:1013; Safa Nicu (T-384/11) 
EU:T:2014:986; Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402; Chart (T-138/14) EU:T:2015:981. See also Evropaïki Dynamiki v EIB 
(T-461/08) EU:T:2011:494 at [208]–[213]. 
94 However, e.g. loss of profit is typically “proven” using hypothetical scenarios, estimations and statistics. 
95 Evidently, this underpins the EU Courts’ discussions regarding the likelihood that particular events or documents cause non-
material harm: see Bank Mellat (C-430/16 P) EU:C:2018:668 at [59]–[60]; Castille (173/82, 157/83 and 186/84) EU:C:1986:54 at 
[30]–[38]; Idromacchine (T-88/09) EU:T:2011:641 at [48]–[49], [73], [92]; Guardian (T-673/15) EU:T:2017:377 at [144]–[147]; 
Josefsson (T-566/16) EU:T:2018:278 at [53]–[57]; Dejaiffe (T-223/99) EU:T:2000:292 at [91]–[94]. Nonetheless, medical 
statements or the like can be required instead of mere likelihood: Girardot (C-348/06 P) EU:C:2008:107 at [30], [87]–[92]. 
96 Consider also Dougan, “Protective Scope” (2017) European Constitutional Law Review 142. 
97 See Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2017:256 at [127]–[131]; Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86 at [59]–[66]; Chart (T-138/14) 
EU:T:2015:981 at [151]–[155]; Oikonomopoulos (T-483/13) EU:T:2016:421 at [244]–[247]; Embassy (T-203/96) EU:T:1998:302 at 
[108]–[109]. See also Kalėda, “Damages in EU Procurement” (2014) E.L. Rev. 203. 
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relevant non-material harm is not clear-cut or easy to apply to particular facts. Investigating these matters is 
challenging because reasoning in the case law is sporadic and often vague. Nevertheless, it is still possible to 
offer some remarks on the topic.  
 
Despite the main rule that the claimant should quantify the harm allegedly suffered, the ECJ has 
acknowledged that, in certain disputes, particularly where it is difficult to express the harm in figures, it is 
not absolutely necessary to particularise the exact extent of the harm in the application or to calculate the 
amount of the compensation.98 The claimant is, nonetheless, under an obligation to explicitly justify why 
quantifying the harm or presenting an exact amount for the compensation claimed is not feasible.99 The EU 
Courts have dismissed or found inadmissible non-material harm claims that have been presented without 
sufficient quantification attempts or justifications for the lack of quantification.100 Nevertheless, there are 
numerous cases where the presented tentative quantifications are (implicitly) found sufficient, or the 
claimants are considered to have sufficiently indicated the facts and evidence on the basis of which the Court 
hearing the case could assess the nature and extent of the harm.101  
 
In practice, it appears wise for the claimants to provide as much information as possible concerning the 
“mechanism” causing the harm, as well as the type of the harm and how in practice it manifests itself, in 
addition to stating that exact monetary quantification is impossible. Moreover, it is prudent to present a 
preliminary suggestion for the amount of compensation.102 
 
When it comes to compensation sums awarded, the EU Courts base the awards of damages, for example, on 
a “fair evaluation ex aequo et bono”,103 or fix the amount of compensation “on an equitable basis”.104 
Generally, the amounts of compensation granted for non-material harm are significantly lower than the sums 
claimed. This phenomenon is common in damages liability cases generally, but in non-material harm case 
law, the difference between the amounts of reparation claimed and awarded can be striking.  
 
                                               
98 Inalca (C-460/09 P) EU:C:2013:111 at [99]–[104]. See also Hectors (C-150/03 P) EU:C:2004:555 at [62]; CNTA SA v 
Commission (74/74) EU:C:1975:59; Granaria v Council and Commission (90/78) EU:C:1979:85. 
99 Hectors (C-150/03 P) EU:C:2004:555 at [62]. See also, e.g. Gordon (T-175/04) EU:T:2007:38 at [43]–[46]; Affatato v 
Commission (T-157/96) EU:T:1998:12 at [38]. 
100 E.g. Inalca and Cremonini v Commission (T-174/06) EU:T:2009:306; Inalca (C-460/09 P) EU:C:2013:111 at [99]–[104]; Gordon 
(C-198/07 P) EU:C:2008:761 at [60]–[63]; Gordon (T-175/04) EU:T:2007:38 at [43]–[46]. 
101 E.g. Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402; Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [87]–[92]; Kendrion (T-479/14) 
EU:T:2017:48; François (T-307/01) EU:T:2004:180. See also TEAM (T-13/96) EU:T:1998:254 at [27]–[30]; Idromacchine (T-
88/09) EU:T:2011:641 at [59]–[76]. 
102 See Inalca (C-460/09 P) EU:C:2013:111 at [88]–[94]; Inalca (T-174/06) EU:T:2009:306. As regards cases heard by the EU 
Courts, Rules of procedure of the GC [2015] OJ L105/1 require that applications are sufficiently precise (art.76). 
103 E.g. Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [92]; Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48 at [135]; M (T-412/05) EU:T:2008:397 at 
[158]. 
104 E.g. François (T-307/01) EU:T:2004:180 at [111]; Chart (T-138/14) EU:T:2015:981 at [151]–[155]. 
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For example in Safa Nicu, the sum claimed for non-material harm was €2 000 000, with €50 000 ultimately 
awarded.105 In Idromacchine, the claimants argued that suitable compensation could be €1 637 892–
2 729 820 (based on a percentage of compensation claimed for material harm), but the GC considered the 
sum of €20 000 to represent fair compensation.106 In recent judgments concerning failure to adjudicate in a 
reasonable time, hundreds of thousands and millions of euros were claimed for non-material harm, but sums 
in the amount of €6000 and €5000 were granted.107 Differences in the amounts claimed and awarded can also 
be significant in staff cases.108 In any event, there are also cases where the awards are, in terms of 
percentages, significantly closer to the compensation claimed,109 and even cases where the amount claimed is 
awarded.110 In the judgments reviewed here, express reasoning concerning the amount awarded is often 
extremely concise and therefore does not include detailed justifications.111 
 
It is noteworthy that EU liability case law entails both judgments where the damages are clearly of a 
symbolic nature as well as decisions where more significant awards are made.112 The nominal nature of 
reparation is visible particularly in staff cases, such as Culin (one French franc).113 In some judgments this 
stems from the fact that the claims presented were based on an idea of mere symbolic correction.114 
                                               
105 Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [92]; Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 at [53], [104]–[107]. 
106 Idromacchine (T-88/09) EU:T:2011:641 at [71]–[76]. Not affected by appeal: Idromacchine (C-34/12 P) EU:C:2013:552. 
107 Compensation was not awarded for all the heads of damages claimed. See Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48 at [112]– [135]; 
Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:1014; Gascogne (T-577/14) EU:T:2017:1 at [157]–[165]; Gascogne (C-138/17 P and 
C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:1013.  
108 E.g. in Reynolds v Parliament (T-237/00) EU:T:2002:11, the claimed amount for non-material harm was €250 000 but a nominal 
compensation of one euro was awarded. On appeal, the ECJ did not deal with the amount of compensation because it was 
unnecessary after finding that the GC should not have annulled the contested decision: Reynolds (C-111/02 P) EU:C:2004:265 at 
[62]–[63]. One euro was also awarded in Dejaiffe (T-223/99) EU:T:2000:292 (€10 000 was claimed). See also the non-contractual 
liability case M (T-412/05) EU:T:2008:397 (€150 000 was claimed and €10 000 was awarded; some of the claimant’s statements 
concerning the harm were found to be incorrect).  
109 E.g. Chart (T-138/14) EU:T:2015:981 at [149]–[155] (€50 000 was claimed and €25 000 awarded). 
110 E.g. Camós Grau v Commission (T-309/03) EU:T:2006:110 at [162]–[164]; Curto (T-275/17) EU:T:2018:479 at [118]. In these, 
the claims were relatively modest (€10 000). 
111 See also earlier remarks by Oliphant, “Damages” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), p.268. 
112 In terms of earlier discussion, see Vaquer, “Damage” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), p.28; Oliphant, “Damages” 
in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), pp.243–244; Wissink, “Overview” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), 
p.358; A.G. Toth, “The Concepts of Damage and Causality as Elements of Non-Contractual Liability” in  H.G. Schermers, T. 
Heukels and J.P. Mead (eds), Non-Contractual Liability of the European Communities (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1988), pp.23, 30; Aalto, Public Liability (2011), p.37. 
113 Culin (C-343/87) EU:C:1990:49 at [25]–[29]. See also Reynolds (T-237/00) EU:T:2002:11 at [154] (one euro); Dejaiffe 
(T-223/99) EU:T:2000:292 (one euro); V v Commission (18/78) EU:C:1979:154 (one ECU). 
114 E.g. Culin (C-343/87) EU:C:1990:49 at [25]–[29]. See also Barbi v Commission (T-73/89) EU:T:1990:65 at [40]–[50]. Compare 
to Reynolds (T-237/00) EU:T:2002:11. 
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Additionally, the compensation is, arguably, to some extent symbolic in cases regarding, for instance, the 
failure to adjudicate in a reasonable time where the awards for non-material harm remain modest.115  
 
The idea of a nominal reparation—intended as a message regarding the recognition of unjust harm—could 
perhaps relate to the notion that it is impossible to translate properly the damage suffered into euros.116 
Further, even where the nature and gravity of the harm have apparently had some impact on the 
compensation granted, an underlying idea of “essentially symbolic” reparation can affect the awards. The EU 
Courts’ emphasis on the “corrective power” of recognising the unjustness of the wrongful conduct is visible 
in the approach explored above, according to which the annulment of a contested measure or a finding of 
unlawfulness is a central means of remedying non-material harm. Nevertheless, the Courts have awarded 
considerable damages in individual cases.117 Additionally, the amount of compensation fluctuating from case 
to case could indicate genuine efforts to truly remedy the harm.118  
 
Ultimately, the circumstances where only nominal compensation is granted and those where more significant 
sums are awarded do not appear to be clearly explained by the case law.119 Moreover, and as noted by 
commentators, the relationship between nominal awards and the principle of full compensation is potentially 
problematic.120 However, the EU Courts appear to just essentially combine harm quantification and 
compensation reasoning, rather than first quantifying the harm and then discussing appropriate 
compensation. This, in theory, eliminates the full compensation controversy, as no harm found goes without 
compensation.121 However, this also brings us back to the ambiguity and unpredictability that surrounds the 
finding of relevant harm in the first place.  
 
                                               
115 E.g. Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48; Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:1014; Gascogne (T-577/14) EU:T:2017:1; 
Gascogne (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:1013. See also Opinion of AG Wahl in Gascogne (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) 
EU:C:2018:620 at [97]. 
116 See also Opinion of AG Wahl in Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:612 at [108]–[110], [125]. 
117 E.g. Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402; Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 (€50 000 awarded for non-material harm); 
Vainker (T-48/01) EU:T:2004:61 at [178]–[180] (€60 000 awarded for non-material harm); Chart (T-138/14) EU:T:2015:981 (€25 
000 awarded for non-material harm). 
118 See also the discussion regarding the factors affecting the amounts awarded: M. Honoré and N. Eram Jensen, “Damages in State 
Aid Cases” (2011) 10 European State Aid Law Quarterly 265, 284. The authors cite the cases Casini v Commission (T-132/03) 
EU:T:2005:324; Morello v Commission (T-181/00) EU:T:2002:313; Allo v Commission (T-386/94) EU:T:1996:123. 
119 See however, e.g. V (18/78) EU:C:1979:154 at [19]: “it must be acknowledged that the applicant is entitled to a gesture from the 
Commission” (emphasis added). 
120 See, e.g. Vaquer, “Damage” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), p.28. 
121 E.g. Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48 at [125]–[135]; Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:1014 at [108]–[112]; Gascogne (T-
577/14) EU:T:2017:1 at [155]–[165]; Gascogne (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:1013 at [44]–[62]. See also Opinion of AG 
Wahl in Gascogne (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:620 at [91], “the mere fact that the [GC] found the amount of 
compensation requested ... not justified, and thus awarded ... a lower sum, does not mean that the [GC] failed to compensate the 
damage in full. It only means that [the claimants] did not provide sufficient evidence to corroborate all the heads of damage”. Note 
also V (18/78) EU:C:1979:154 at [19] (with the Court expressly noting, nevertheless, that the award is symbolic). 
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This main section addresses two interrelated, more specific themes: reputational harm, and the borderline 
between economic and non-material damage. As seen above, EU level cases on sanctions address the effect 
of restrictive measures on reputation or image. Additionally, reputation or professional reputation is 
discussed in a number of staff cases, and even disputes concerning, for example, financial aid or EU public 
procurement touch upon reputational harm. Many of the intricacies of the non-material harm case law 
expounded above—such as the ambiguity related to defining and finding relevant harm—are clearly 
observable in reputation cases. Moreover, in the era of fake news and automatised journalism, the legal 
treatment of harm to reputation is per se interesting and increasingly relevant. From a tort law standpoint, 
reputational harm raises tricky questions, not least because reputation itself is a matter of perception.122  
 
Reputational harm is also an example of damage where the non-material and economic “parts” of the harm 
are challenging to separate from each other. Under EU law, the border between non-pecuniary and economic 
harm appears generally elusive, but seems to have practical relevance as regards the requirements for 
showing damage and in terms of determining compensation. Below, we first analyse the EU Courts’ 
reasoning concerning the compensation of reputational harm, and then briefly explore the broader issue of 




Receiving monetary reparation for reputational harm under EU law is not common. In the case law of the EU 
Courts, this kind of harm is often deemed corrected by the finding of a breach of law or the annulment of a 
decision or measure. For example, in the excessive duration of proceedings cases Gascogne and Kendrion, it 
was indicated that even if proven (which was not the case), reputational harm would not require monetary 
damages.123 A similar finding was made in Guardian,124 and can also be seen in other strands of case law.125 
                                               
122 See on company reputation, e.g. R.G. Eccles, S.C. Newquist, and R. Schatz, “Reputation and its Risks” (February 2007) Harvard 
Business Review, https://hbr.org/2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks [accessed 5 April 2019]. 
123 Gascogne (T-577/14) EU:T:2017:1 at [151]–[154]; Gascogne (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:1013; Kendrion (T-
479/14) EU:T:2017:48 at [122]–[125], [130]. 
124 Guardian (T-673/15) EU:T:2017:377 at [42]–[43], [142]–[148], [108]–[115]. 
125 E.g. European Dynamics (T-299/11) EU:T:2015:757 at [155] (an appeal did not affect the treatment: EUIPO (C‐677/15 P) 
EU:C:2017:998). See also Opinion of AG Sharpston in Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (C-100/17 P) EU:C:2018:214 at [105]. 
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Only exceptionally, such as in the sanctions case Safa Nicu, is monetary compensation considered 
necessary.126  
 
When discussing reputational harm in detail, the EU courts often understand it to be a type of non-material 
damage. However, it remains somewhat ambiguous as to what exactly non-material harm to reputation 
refers. In several cases, non-material harm to reputation is expressly distinguished from economic harm, 
such as loss of profits,127 but exhaustive explanations of what non-economic harm to reputation entails are 
lacking. According to the EU Courts, non-material harm to company reputation occurs, for example, when a 
company is “publicly associated with conduct which is considered a serious threat to international peace and 
security”, as a result of which “it becomes an object of opprobrium and suspicion”, the behaviour of third 
parties towards the company is affected, and the effects of these developments go beyond the company’s 
“current commercial interests”.128 Similarly, non-economic reputational harm of natural persons can manifest 
itself as opprobrium and suspicion, and can be observed on the basis of how third parties behave towards the 
person in question.129 Open issues nevertheless include the question of what, precisely, harm to “professional 
reputation” of an individual refers to—and when harm to professional reputation is of an economic nature 
and when it is a non-material one. Additionally, the question of what kind of harm can be compensated as 
harm to professional reputation and what as harm to the ("general") reputation of natural persons is also 
relevant.130 
 
Additional issues include those of when does recoverable non-material harm to reputation occur and how 
long can it continue, things that the EU Courts have not addressed in an exhaustive manner. In Guardian, the 
GC noted that harm to reputation could be a continuing type of damage, which signifies that it occurs all the 
time for as long as, for example, a press release containing negative information is publicly available.131 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the elimination of the original cause of the damage, or even the 
publication of a correction, does not necessarily “correct” company reputation because those third parties 
who have seen only the original harmful information will not subsequently change their views.132 
Accordingly, harm to reputation or image could continue to occur, and even “expand”, endlessly. This theme 
was touched upon, but not resolved from the standpoint of the extent of liability, in Safa Nicu, a case in 
                                               
126 Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402; Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [87]–[91] (underlining the seriousness of the 
unjustified allegations, the long duration of their effects, and the fact that the incorrect information was made public as an official 
statement of position by an EU body).  
127 E.g. Sviluppo (C-414/08 P) EU:C:2010:165; Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402; Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 [72]–
[85]. 
128 Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [80], [82], [88]; Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 at [52]–[53], [104]–[105]. See 
also Bank Mellat (C-430/16 P) EU:C:2018:668 at [59]. 
129 Abdulrahim (C-239/12 P) EU:C:2013:331 at [72]–[83]; Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86 at [62]–[66]. 
130 See, e.g. the vague discussions in M (T-412/05) EU:T:2008:397 at [150]–[158]; Camós Grau (T-309/03) EU:T:2006:110. 
131 Guardian (T-673/15) EU:T:2017:377 at [38]–[42]. 
132 A point implied in Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [88]. 
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which information regarding restrictive measures and allegations on nuclear proliferation remained publicly 
available on third party websites even after the annulment of the measures.133 In practice, EU liability for 
“distant” non-material harm created by a “chain” of negative publicity appears unlikely.134 
 
More generally, compensation for reputational harm is frequently declined because causation and/or legally 
relevant damage have not been sufficiently shown. The threshold for finding harm to reputation is often high, 
and negative developments that can be considered to be, for example, normal business risks do not constitute 
recoverable harm. With respect to EU procurement cases, damages for harm to reputation have been 
generally declined where there has not been any specific reason for assuming that a tenderer’s reputation was 
particularly harmed. Merely losing the contract, or the fact that the procedure was unlawfully halted, does 
not prima facie tarnish the reputation of tenderers, and negative assessments by contracting authorities will 
not cause recoverable harm if the views are expressed in a neutral manner and are factually correct.135 
Recoverable damage can nevertheless be found, for example, where factually questionable and significantly 
harmful assessments (that for instance state that the tenderer is not a reliable commercial partner) are made 
public.136 Similarly, in cases concerning financial aid to companies, the mere fact that aid is reduced is not 
considered to tarnish the reputation of the recipient.137 Clearly harmful comments concerning an undertaking 
combined with a breach of professional secrecy in the context of a state aid investigation have, however, 
resulted in damages liability.138 
 
In sanctions cases in particular, the EU Courts have underlined the significance of the (visible) reactions of 
third parties.139 However, it is not clear what kind of reactions and what kind of proof are then sufficient in 
order to establish non-material harm. In case of economic harm, such as lost profits, a claimant may seek to 
show that its commercial contractual relationships ended or that it did not receive new orders, but do factors 
like these also prove that there was, in addition to economic harm, non-material harm? Further, while visible 
reactions or actions of third parties can tell something about company image or reputation, it is also possible 
                                               
133 Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 at [108]–[109]. 
134 The existing case law suggests that the scope of recoverable harm is likely very limited. See also Opinion of AG Mengozzi in 
Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2016:658 at [112]. 
135 See European Dynamics (T-299/11) EU:T:2015:757 at [155] (not affected by appeal: EUIPO (C‐677/15 P) EU:C:2017:998); 
TEAM (T-13/96) EU:T:1998:254 at [77]–[78] (not affected by appeal: TEAM Srl (C-13/99 P) EU:C:2000:329); Icuna.Com SCRL 
(T-383/06 and T-71/07) EU:T:2008:148 at [97]–[98]; Embassy (T-203/96) EU:T:1998:302 at [108]; Order of the President of the GC 
in Computer Resources International v Commission (T-422/11 R) EU:T:2011:566 at [39]–[42]; Order of the President of the GC in 
Communicaid Group v Commission (T-4/13 R) EU:T:2013:121 at [40]–[41].  
136 See New Europe (T-231/97) EU:T:1999:146 at [5], [53]–[56]. For more on EU procurement cases, see Kalėda, “Damages in EU 
Procurement” (2014) E.L. Rev. 201–202. 
137 Sviluppo (C-414/08 P) EU:C:2010:165 at [139]–[142]. See also Holistic Innovation (T-468/14) EU:T:2016:296 at [83]–[84]; 
Holistic Innovation Institute v Commission (C-411/16 P) EU:C:2017:445. 
138 Idromacchine (T-88/09) EU:T:2011:641 at [48], [63]–[76]; Idromacchine (C-34/12 P) EU:C:2013:552. 
139 E.g. Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [87]–[91]; Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 at [52]–[53], [104]–[105]; 
Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86 at [62]–[66]. 
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that reputation is harmed without there being immediate and demonstrable reactions from others. For 
instance, negative company image may affect the willingness of potential employees to work at a particular 
company, but this is not necessarily observable before the company attempts to hire new staff. Proving a 
causal connection between the original wrongful conduct (alleged cause) and action or inaction of third 
parties is generally challenging, and even more so when the harm manifests itself after a period of time. 
Moreover, establishing that reputational harm is sufficiently actual and certain, and not just purely 
speculative, is difficult.140 In fact, actual and certain non-material harm to reputation, which extends beyond 
current economic interests, is nearly an oxymoron. 
 
Notably, it seems that the EU Courts can be willing, at least in some cases, to (implicitly) accept likely 
causally connected harm without truly requiring harm and causation to be established. For example, in Safa 
Nicu, the EU Courts’ discussion about the presence of causally connected non-pecuniary damage is concise. 
Causation and relevant harm are seemingly assumed; however, no statement is made to the effect that 
establishing these conditions is unnecessary because unlawful restrictive measures are, due to their gravity, 
inherently likely to cause non-material harm.141 Considering the fact that some cases illustrate a high 
threshold for finding recoverable harm to reputation, it is striking how bluntly and simply relevant harm is 
found in Safa Nicu. 
 
While the EU Courts’ reasoning regarding harm to reputation is not extremely detailed, an obvious question 
that arises is what, in practice, distinguishes those cases where monetary compensation for reputational harm 
is awarded, despite the apparently cautious overall approach to granting damages. Although the judgments 
do not tend to involve elaborate explanations regarding the application of the conditions of harm and 
causation, in many cases the outcomes “seem just”.142 It seems as though the EU Courts abstain from 
                                               
140 See also Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986 at [70]–[85]; Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86 at [62]–[67]. 
141 In Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986, the GC started by trying to distinguish economic and non-material harm, and noted that 
non-material harm extends beyond “current commercial interests”. The finding of non-material harm is not explained in length (at 
[72]–[85]). At [80], “when an entity is the subject of restrictive measures because of the support it is has allegedly given to nuclear 
proliferation, it is publicly associated with conduct which is considered a serious threat to international peace and security, as a result 
of which it becomes an object of opprobrium and suspicion (which thus affects its reputation) and is therefore caused non-material 
damage.” At [85]: “In view of the foregoing ... the restrictive measures concerning the applicant caused it non-material damage, 
distinct from any material loss resulting from an impact on its commercial relations.” See also Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 
at [50]–[53], [103]–[107]. Compare to, e.g. SELEX (C-481/07 P) EU:C:2009:461 at [38]; Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86. 
142 E.g. compensation was granted in Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402, but reparation for reputational harm has been denied in 
cases concerning failures to adjudicate in a reasonable time (Gascogne (T-577/14) EU:T:2017:1; Gascogne (C-138/17 P and 
C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:1013; Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48), and in EU procurement cases where nothing particularly 
“reputation-harming” occurs (e.g. European Dynamics (T-299/11) EU:T:2015:757 at [155]; EUIPO (C‐677/15 P) EU:C:2017:998). 
Similarly, the EU courts have been generally reluctant to award compensation in staff cases but nevertheless have awarded reparation 
in situations that involve factually incorrect and per se offensive, widely distributed comments on a person’s abilities or conduct (e.g. 
François (T-307/01) EU:T:2004:180, see also M (T-412/05) EU:T:2008:397, compare to e.g. PB (T-609/16) EU:T:2017:910 at [95]–
[98]; CJ (T-692/16) EU:T:2017:894 at [128]–[129]). 
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awarding monetary damages for non-material harm to reputation where the claim is far-fetched, but are 
willing to provide reparation where the factual circumstances point to obvious detrimental effects to 
reputation/image and the negative effects are clearly related to the breach of EU law identified.143 This is, in 
itself, a reasonable overall logic. However, more explicit reasoning from the EU Courts regarding the factors 
underpinning awards of monetary compensation would be welcome. Particularly valuable would be a 
detailed discussion concerning the application of the conditions of harm and causation as well as regarding 
the issue of when relevant harm can prima facie be presumed to have occurred.144 
 
The border between non-material and economic harm and the relevance of distinguishing these 
 
A broader topical issue is that of which harms should be considered non-pecuniary and which economic. 
Rarely discussed explicitly in the case law, the classification of harms and the use of the label of non-
material harm are nevertheless of practical relevance. The preceding review suggests that whether a harm is 
considered non-pecuniary or economic in nature can potentially affect the application of the conditions for 
liability, whether monetary damages will or will not be awarded, and the amount of compensation. 
Moreover, the EU Courts often appear to adopt a particularly strict approach to establishing actual and 
certain, causally connected harm and its extent when a claim concerns economic damage.145 In theory, non-
material harm cases are not the only ones where some kind of facilitations (claimant-friendly presumptions) 
could be applied due to the nature of the harm and objective difficulty of presenting conclusive proof.146 
Nevertheless, the (occasional) more lenient treatment as regards establishing the fact and extent of relevant 
harm appears to take place solely with respect to non-material harm, not other losses.147 
 
                                               
143 To illustrate this point, the excessive duration of court proceedings does not inherently significantly affect the reputation of the 
parties involved, but an official statement alleging connections to reprehensible nuclear proliferation does. See also the reasoning in 
Bank Mellat (C-430/16 P) EU:C:2018:668 at [54]–[61].  
144 There are partially inexplicable differences in the considerations visible in different cases, e.g. while rejecting compensation 
because of a procedural reason in the sanctions case Jannatian (T-328/14) EU:T:2016:86, the GC nonetheless indicated that there is 
no actual damage that would require monetary reparation (at [61]–[66]). It seems that here the GC is more reluctant to find relevant 
harm than in Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986. 
145 E.g. Safa Nicu (C-45/15 P) EU:C:2017:402 at [64]–[67], [71]–[80], [94]–[99]; Safa Nicu (T-384/11) EU:T:2014:986; Kendrion 
(C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:1014; Gascogne (C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) EU:C:2018:1013; SELEX (C-481/07 P) EU:C:2009:461 
at [37]–[38]. 
146 See Inalca (C-460/09 P) EU:C:2013:111 at [104]; Hectors (C-150/03 P) EU:C:2004:555 at [62]. 
147 In addition to cases cited in fn.145 above, see, e.g. the discussion in Guardian (T-673/15) EU:T:2017:377; European Union v 
ASPLA and Armando Álvarez (C-174/17 P and C-222/17 P) EU:C:2018:1015. Generally, the apparently strict treatment of causally 
connected economic harm can relate to the argumentation advanced by the parties. It is possible that claimants do not, e.g. discuss the 
difficulties of establishing the quantum of economic harm in that much detail, whereas in the context of non-material harm this can 
be a more “inherent” part of the argumentation. Detailed justifications for not indicating the exact quantum of, e.g. lost profits, could 
be accepted if presented. 
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However, the border between non-material and economic harm can be hazy,148 this being the case even under 
EU law. It can be unclear, for instance, whether the harms discussed in a particular case are of a non-material 
or pecuniary nature. Further, harms that in reality are best characterised as potential future economic losses 
can generally be referred to as non-material harm.149 Moreover, there are EU level cases which treat loss of 
chance or opportunity as non-material harm and cases which classify it as economic harm.150 With respect to 
damages suffered in the context of commercial or professional activities, non-material and economic harm 
may be difficult to distinguish from each other, even at the level of theory.151  
 
The difference in treatment or classification in EU level cases suggests that the border between non-material 
and economic harm, or the relevant desirable solutions in this respect, are not self-evident to the EU Courts. 
An additional possibility is that, in some situations, the EU Courts do not find distinguishing between non-
material and economic harm important. Nevertheless, because the classification of harm can affect its 
treatment (intentionally or not), the categories of harm and the use of the notion of non-material harm should 
be well thought through. Moreover, it appears practically and theoretically problematic to utilise the concept 
of non-material harm while meaning hypothetical future economic harm and simultaneously hold on to the 
starting point that only actual and certain harm is recoverable under EU law. It seems, therefore, that EU law 





This article has provided a brief overview of EU level judgments concerning non-material harm. Further, it 
has explored selected substantive issues that either deserve special attention in the context of non-pecuniary 
damage (such as the practical application of the conditions of harm and causation), or can be characterised as 
particular features of non-material harm cases (such as finding monetary compensation unnecessary, or 
awarding merely nominal compensation). Also investigated was the notion of reputational harm and the 
border between non-material and economic harm. 
                                               
148 See, e.g. conclusions based on comparative work: Rogers, “Comparative Report” in Non-Pecuniary Loss (2001), pp.288–289. 
149 See, e.g. Kendrion (T-479/14) EU:T:2017:48 (state of uncertainty, reputational harm); Camós Grau (T-309/03) EU:T:2006:110 
(professional reputation, professional situation). See also Oikonomopoulos (T-483/13) EU:T:2016:421 at [244]–[247]; Idromacchine 
(T-88/09) EU:T:2011:641 at [63]–[69]; Opinion of AG Wahl in Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:612 at [112]–[116]. With respect 
to other European liability regimes see Rogers, “Comparative Report” in Non-Pecuniary Loss (2001), pp.288–289; V. Wilcox, A 
Company's Right to Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), pp.62–79. 
150 See, e.g. Farrugia (T-230/94) EU:T:1996:40 at [42]–[46]; Moat (T-13/92) EU:T:1993:22 at [44]–[49], compare to Girardot 
(C-348/06 P) EU:C:2008:107; Citymo (T-271/04) EU:T:2007:128. See also Evropaïki Dynamiki (T-461/08) EU:T:2011:494 at 
[207]–[213], and further Vaquer, “Damage” in Tort Law of the European Community (2008), pp.42–43; Kalėda, “Damages in EU 
Procurement” (2014) E.L. Rev. 203–206. 
151 See also, e.g. discussions by Heinze, Schadenersatz (2017), pp.220–226, 309–310; Oliphant, “Damages” in Tort Law of the 
European Community (2008), p.260. 
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EU law does not encompass any generally applicable, coherent tort law regime, and the existing EU 
legislation that mentions non-material harm is sector-specific. Both “sectoral” and more general EU law on 
damages liability is nevertheless developed by the ECJ. Overall, the flow of new EU level cases touching 
upon non-material harm appears constant.152 Non-pecuniary harm is frequently addressed in various EU 
liability disputes. Further, EU liability judgments can also have implications with respect to other kinds of 
damages cases. In particular, the interpretation of central notions of EU law, particularly as regards their 
application to different non-pecuniary loss situations, is of clear broader relevance. Judicial reasoning 
concerning non-material harm does not appear highly field-specific,153 which increases the likelihood of its 
relevance even in other types of cases. 
 
Preliminary rulings on horizontal liability have also discussed non-material harm, although these leave the 
details to be resolved by national courts and mostly provide comments regarding the principal question of 
whether this type of harm is covered by damages liability or the concept of “damage” in a particular field. 
Member State liability is an area where issues of non-material harm have not yet been significantly explored. 
Generally, in preliminary rulings, matters related to recoverability of non-material harm, or to the issue of 
how easy obtaining compensation for this kind of damage should be, could surface as a part of 
considerations related to guaranteeing the full effect of EU law or effective judicial protection. If the ECJ 
addresses non-material harm in this kind of context, the guidance could be relevant in different types of cases 
heard by national courts. However, it remains to be seen whether, when and how the ECJ will embrace these 
matters.  
 
Central substantive issues 
 
Overall, recoverability of non-material harm under EU law appears a valid presumption where no clear 
indications regarding the alternative are visible. The most detailed substantive reasoning concerning the 
compensation of non-pecuniary loss is currently found in EU liability cases, which are heard by the EU 
Courts in their entirety, whereas preliminary rulings only deal with the selected questions of law that are 
submitted to the ECJ. Even under EU liability, central questions such as the details of the application of the 
conditions of harm and causation, and establishing these preconditions in a sufficient manner, remain 
partially obscure. It is likely that the case law further evolves, bringing, bit-by-bit, more clarity regarding the 
considerations related to finding liability. Nonetheless, the evaluation of harm and causation will 
conceivably always remain, to some extent, casuistic because of the fact-intensity of these issues. 
                                               
152 E.g. a Curia database (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en) search of closed GC and ECJ cases from the years 
2017–2018 with the free text search term ”non-material harm” produces 51 hits (as of 29 December 2018). 
153 Having said that, the ECJ nevertheless often cites case law from the same area, that is, staff cases in staff cases and so on. See, 
however, e.g. Staelen (C-337/15 P) EU:C:2017:256; Opinion of AG Wahl in Kendrion (C-150/17 P) EU:C:2018:612 at [103]–[116]: 
in these, different types of cases are recalled.  
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A particularity of non-material harm cases is that financial reparation is often considered unnecessary. An 
observable starting point, which applies to different strands of EU liability case law, is that harm closely 
related to an unlawful measure or other breach of EU law is remedied primarily by the annulment of the said 
measure or by a finding of unlawfulness. 
 
The obligation upon a claimant to quantify the harm and present the specific amount of compensation 
claimed applies, prima facie, even in non-material harm cases. Nonetheless, the EU Courts can find claims 
sufficiently precise even in the absence of exact quantification, as long as the claimant explicitly argues that 
measuring the harm or objectively valuing it in monetary terms is not possible. The claimant must in all 
instances, however, provide information on the nature of the harm suffered. The amounts of reparation 
granted by the EU Courts for non-material harm often remain modest and, in some cases, even nominal. It is 
difficult to envision how the case law will evolve in the future, but one relatively safe prediction is that it 




The EU Courts have recently tackled reputational harm in contexts such as failures to adjudicate in a 
reasonable time and foreign and security policy sanctions. Previously, cases regarding EU procurement, EU 
officials and financial aid, for example, have often included claims for reputational harm. Nonetheless, many 
details regarding addressing harm to reputation are still open under EU law, and even the concept of non-
material reputational harm itself remains blurry.  
 
A related issue is the generally unclear nature of the borderline between non-material and economic harm. 
There is some ambiguity, and even inconsistencies, in the classification of harms in EU level judgments. The 
distinction between economic and non-material harm does, however, seem to matter in terms of case 
outcomes. For instance, merely nominal damages awards appear in non-material harm cases but not 
elsewhere. Non-material harm cases also involve a particular (occasional) willingness of the EU Courts to 
accept that it is likely that wrongful conduct caused harm. 
 
Liability for non-material harm has the potential to become increasingly relevant in the near future, for 
instance as regards horizontal liability. New preliminary rulings on the interpretation of recent pieces of EU 
secondary legislation, such as those relating to data protection154 or trade secrets,155 will likely be seen in the 
coming years. Notably, although several contemporary secondary laws mention non-material harm, details 
regarding liability and determining the amount of compensation are, significantly, left for national systems 
                                               
154 General Data Protection Regulation [2016] OJ L119/1, see art.82(1). 
155 Directive 2016/943 on the protection of trade secrets [2016] OJ L157/1, see art.14, recital 30. 
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that are required to operate within the “outer limits” set out by EU law. Case law on EU liability on the one 
hand, and on full effect, effective judicial protection and national procedural autonomy on the other, can 
provide hints as to what kind of decisions by Member State courts are EU law compatible, but further 
guidance by the ECJ is also likely needed. In areas where there is no legislation expressly mentioning non-
material harm, the role of the ECJ in clarifying the law is even more important. For instance, it will be 
interesting to see whether the ECJ will expressly state at some point that ensuring the right to compensation 
for non-material harm is generally required in Member States as a part of guaranteeing effective judicial 
protection in cases of breach of EU law. 
